| The shape of it |
| The agent |
Claude Code, Codex or Antigravity, your pick |
Claude |
| Where it thinks |
On your machine; the daemon binds to loopback |
In Anthropic’s cloud |
| What it costs |
Nothing beyond the agent subscription you already have |
A paid Claude plan |
| Browsers |
Chrome, Edge, Brave, Arc: any Chromium browser |
Google Chrome only |
| Source |
MIT licensed, source available |
Proprietary |
| Who else can drive |
Any MCP client: Claude Code, Cursor, Zed share one browser |
Claude apps only |
| On the page |
| Read, click, type, submit |
Yes, and anything consequential asks first |
Yes, with vendor safeguards |
| Console and network |
Yes: errors, failed requests and timings, read over Chrome’s debugger |
Yes |
| Files |
Both directions, each gated: downloads land sealed, uploads ask first |
Both directions |
| Show it a job once |
Recordings: do it yourself, later say “do it like last time” |
Workflow recording, in the classic panel |
| Site knowledge |
Site maps: it explores any site and keeps notes, intranets included |
Built in for Gmail, Slack, Calendar, Docs and GitHub |
| While you are elsewhere |
| Scheduled jobs |
Kept in the extension; survives the agent, the client and the daemon |
Kept in Claude’s cloud |
| Long jobs |
Background monitors track progress without an agent or a token |
An agent has to keep looking |
| The obvious commands |
“Go back” and “open github.com” run locally, in milliseconds |
Every instruction is a model round trip |
| Voice |
Dictate in the panel, press to talk in the popup |
Type |
| Trust |
| Credentials |
Sealed into placeholders; the agent never sees plaintext |
1Password integration; declines sensitive entry |
| Approvals |
A declarative policy, every rule tunable, per-site grants |
Ask before acting, or autonomous with fixed safeguards |
| Prompt injection |
Containment: scoped runs, a sealed agent, page text marked untrusted |
Detection: trained classifiers watch for suspicious patterns |